Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Julie M. Child v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah : Defendant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Julie M. Child; Pro Se;
K. Allan Zabel; Utah Department of Employment Security; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Child v. Board of Review, No. 18169 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2825

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JULIE M. CHILD,
·Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 18169

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from a decision of the Department of Employment Security,
State of Utah, as upheld by the Appeals Referee
· and the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission,
State of Utah

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

JULIE M. CHILD
~···Plaintiff-Appel Iant

n10 ~enter Parkway #63
;Sacramento, CA 95823
Pro Se

FI LE
APR 14 1982

FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General
1Nocial Hall Avenue
Sf!!J-ake City, Utah 84147

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent

_....-.-------....---------------------.....

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
~
tlerk. Sapnme Court, Ut•lt
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
NATURE OF THE CASE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••.••

DI SPOSI Tl ON BELOW.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • • • • • . • . • • • . . . . • . • • . . .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW.............................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................

2

ARGUMENT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2

POI NT I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2

II............................................................

3

POI NT I I I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . .

7

CONCLUSION..........................................................

11

THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSlON UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL
AFFIRM THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

POINT

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO THE FACTS OF THE
CLAIMANT'S CASE, AND SUCH DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

CASE CITED
Ayers v. Employment Security Department, 536 P. 2d 610 (Wash.
1975). ....... .. .......... ... ... .. ... . ... .... .. ... .. ..... ... ... .

10

Bliley Electric Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898, 903 (1946}........

6

Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Co1mnssion of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729............

3

Denby v Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 567 P.
-----2d 626 (Utah 1977).............................................

4

Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 0. ~d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962)..............

4

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
CASES CITED (Continued)

PAGE
Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).....

3

Mills v. Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581 P. 2d 1334. •• • •• • •• •• • •• ••• •• •••

4

Norton y. Department of Employment Security, 22 U. 2d 24, 447 P.
2d 907 ( 1968) • .••••••••••••.••.•• ·• . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • •

5

Olaf Nelson Construction Com~any v. The Industrial Commission,
121 0. 521, 243 P. 2d 9 I (1952)................................

4

Raytheon Company v. Director of Division of Employment Security,
196 N.E. 2d 196
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

10

Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P. 2d 254 (Utah, 1980)..............

5

Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Industrial Commission, 134 P.
2d 479, 485, (Utah, 1943).......................................

8

Townsend v. Board of Review, 27 U. 2d 94, 493 P. 2d 614 (1972)......

5

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
General Rules of Adjudication, Section 40, Voluntary Leaving........

5

General Rules of Adjudication, Section 210, Voluntary Leaving.......

8

Senate Bill 68, 1982 Budget Session.................................

10

13 AL R 2d 976 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1O

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Pocket Supplement (1979), 35-4-5(a) ••• l,2,3,7,10
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 35-4-lO(i) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1,2,3

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JULIE M. CHILD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 18169

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant
to Section 35-4-lO{i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial
review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, affinning the decision of an Appeal Referee which denied benefits to
the claimant, Julie M. Child, effective August 16, 1981, pursuant to Section
35-4-5{a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended {Pocket Supplement, 1979),
on the grounds that the claimant voluntarily left work without good cause.
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DISPOSITION BELOW

Plaintiff, Julie M.
denied unemployment

Child (hereinafter

benefits

effective

referred to as claimant), was

August

16,

1981,

by

a Department

Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

Representative pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a),

amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on
the grounds

she

voluntarily

claimant appealed to

left work

an Appeal

without

Referee

who

good cause.

(R.0039)

The

affirmed the decision to deny

benefits by a decision dated October 14, 1981.

(R.0023-0024)

Upon further

appeal, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Referee by
decision issued December 4, 1981, in Case No. 81-A-3663, 81-BR-352.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW

Claimant seeks

a reversal

unemployment benefits.

of the

Board

of

Review's decision denying

Defendant seeks affirmance of such decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant substantially agrees with the statement of facts set forth in
claimant's Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE Fl.NDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

The standard of review in unemp 1 oyment insurance cases is we 11
1 i shed.

Section 35-4-lO(i),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

estab-

1953, provides in part:

2
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In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the
facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and
the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be
disturbed.

Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

In analyzing the above-referenced review provision, this Court has stated:
Under Section 35-4-lO(i) the role of this Court is to
sustain the determination of the Board of Review unless
the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of
the Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the determination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion
could be drawn from the facts. Continental Oil Company
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
(Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729.
'
POINT 11
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE.
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Pocket Supplement, 1979)
provides:
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the commission,
and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for such services equal to at least six times
the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provided, that no
claimant shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant
leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose
a disqualification.
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The commission shall in cooperation with the employer
consider for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness
of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the
actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and
good conscience.
This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is 'to assist a worker and his family in times when he is out of work
without fault on his part.

Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Depart-

ment of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); and that the
Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering to the volitional test.

01 af Nelson Construction Company

--

v. The Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Mills v.
Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581 P. 2d 1334.
The issue in the instant case is a relatively simple one.

Is a claimant

entitled to unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving work to accompany
her spouse to a new area in order for the spouse to attend school?.
Defendant substantfally agrees with the definition of "good cause" as
set forth in.Plaintiff's Brief, pages 5-6.

The definition of "good cause"

may be summarized by the quotation included in Pl ai nti ff' s Brief from the
l

case of Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 626
(Utah l 977):
"Good cause" has been defined as "such cause as would
similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is limited to those instances where the
unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling that a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in
quitting under similar circumstances." (Citation omitted, emphasis added)
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In the instant case it is undisputed that the reason for the claimant's voluntary leaving was to accompany her spouse to California in order for him to
attend law school.

It is well established that quitting work to attend

school is not good cause.

General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving,

Section 40; Norton v. Department of Employment Security, 22 U. 2d 24, 447 P.
2d 907 (1968); Townsend v. Board- of Review, 27 U. 2d 94, 493 P. 2d 614
(1972); Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P. 2d 254 (Utah, 1980).
has not had prior opportunity to rule

on

This Court

the specific issue presented in the

instant case, that is, whether a claimant who quits to follow her husband in
order for him to attend school does so with good cause.
Commission is strightforward:

The position of the

The policy of the State that leaving work to

attend school is not good cause should be extended to the claimant who leaves
work to accompany his/her spouse in order for the spouse to attend school.
It should be noted that the rules and cases cited by claimant in support of her position in this case pertain primarily to leaving work to
accompany a spouse when the spouse has other employment at the new location.
Claimant does not cite any cases which allow benefits to a claimant who quits
to accompany a spouse to a new area where the spouse begins attending school.
The reason for this is readily ascertainable.

As stated in the Denby deci-

sfon, a quit is with good cause when that quit is motivated by external
pressures so compelling that a reasonable, prudent person would be justified
in quitting.

In the instant case claimant alleges that such compelling cir-

cumstances existed in her need to preserve the family relationship.

Yet that

need only arose through the personal desire of the claimant's spouse to attend law school.

Such personal reasons ·are certainly not "external pressures
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so compelling" as to constitute good cause.

In this regard the claimant's

statement that a denial of benefits would mean the only compelling reason
for quitting to accompany a spouse would be when that spouse has other work
in the new area is not a correct statement of policy or the 1aw.

Personal

reasons may exist which compel an individual to leave work and move to
a new area, without having a 1ready secured new work, such as a need to care
for an i 11 family member or other circumstances which constitute 1egi timate
external pressures to which a reasonably prudent person would respond.

Thus,

it may be said that "external compelling" circumstances are those circumstances which originate outside of the control of the claimant or as in the
instant case outside of the control of the claimant's spouse.

When the

claimant's unemployment becomes the result of her own volitional action, or
that of her spouse, good cause may not be found to exist.
The foregoing analysis of good cause finds support in the reasoning of
a Superior Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Bl i 1ey Electric Company v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898,
903 (1946).

In the Bliley case the Court explained good cause in terms which

are now we 11 known and consistent with most juri sdi cti ons.

The Court then

went on to apply its definition of good cause to the situation of a married
woman who leaves her work to join or accompany her husband, as follows:
When we approach the problem of a married woman who
leaves her work to join her husband we realize immediately that we are in the presence of a compulsion which
readily supplies a personal reason and a good cause.
Under our law, it is the legal right of the husband to
select the marital domicile and it is the legal duty of
the wife to reside with him. Hence, when a husband moves
the marital domicile to a distant point where he secures
work and his wife voluntarily leaves her work to accompany him, her compliance with the duty which the law casts
upon her satisfies the requirement of "good cause."
6
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On the other hand, joining a husband at a distant point
may not always constitute good cause for a wife's leaving her employment. Obviously, a wife joining her husband who is enjoying an extended vacation, would not be
justified in leaving her employment, unless per chance
a serious illness required her attendance upon him. A
husband may take a temporary or transient job in another
locality without changing the marital domicile; in that
case, no other circumstances appearing, a wife would not
be justified in leaving her employment. The nature of
the circumstances in each individual case, the strength
and effect of the compulsive pressure of external and
objective forces must be evaluated, and if they are sufficiently potent, they become relevant and controlling
factors.
The Court in Bliley found the claimant had good cause to leave work and join
her husband in another state.

However, in that case the claimant's husband

had been transferred to the other state by the military.

In the instant case

the claimant's reason for leaving work to accompany her husband was solely to
be with him whi 1e attending school.

Thus, compulsive pressure of external

and objective forces, referred to in the Bliley decision, simply do not
appear in the instant case.
POINT llI
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO THE FACTS OF THE CLAIMANT'S CASE, AND SUCH DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
Claimant contends that even if good cause is not established for the
claimant's voluntary leaving of employment, it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience to deny benefits under Sec ti on 5{ a} of the Act.

The

basis of the claimant's contention in this regard is that the remedial purpose of the Act to provide a cushion to the shock and rigors of unemployment
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ba 1ances in favor of a11 owance of benefits and that the claimant 1 s decision
to leave work was reasonable to preserve the marital relationship with her
spouse.
The General Rules of Adj udi ca ti on, Voluntary Leaving, Sec ti on 210, explains the application of equity and good conscience, in part, as follows:
If it is determined that "good cause" does not exist,
then the surrounding circumstances must be reviewed to
determine whether the claimant's actions were such that
a disqualification under this section of law would be
contrary to equity and good conscience. The statute
requires that three factors be considered in making a
determination of whether equity and good conscience required the disqualification to be abated:
1.

The purposes of the Employment Security Act.

2.

The reasonableness of the claimant's actions; and

3.

The extent to which the claimant's actions evidence
a genuine attachment to the labor market.

The Defendant does not dispute that the claimant evidenced a genuine
attachment to the labor market by reason of her efforts to find work after
relocatfng in California.

However, the claimant's decision to leave work

was not reasonable either under the remedial nature of the act or in her
desire to preserve the marital relationship.

As noted in the claimant's

Brief, at page 13, the purpose of the Employment Security Act is:
[R]emedial to protect the health, morals and welfare of
the people by providing a cushion against the shock and
rigors of unemployment. Being remedial under the police
powers and not imposing limitations on basic rights, it
should be liberally construed. Singer Sewing Machine
Company v. Industrial Commission, 134 P. 2d 479, 485,
( Ota h, 1943 •
As previously noted herein this Court has also held that the purpose of the
Employment Security Act is to assist a worker and his family in times when
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he is out of work without fay,l t on his part, and that the Department is to
determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering
to the volitional test.

It is apparent from the fact that the Legislature

did not eliminate the "at fault" concept in unemployment cases, that the
Legislature mu st have intended a me 1ding or b1ending of the fault concept
with the purpose of maintaining purchasing power in the community when an
individual becomes unemployed by reason of a voluntary quit, but under mitigating circumstances.

For that reason, the commission is required to also

look at the reasonableness of the claimant's actions under the circumstances
as well as whether the claimant has evidenced a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market.
In the instant case the claimant contends that her actions were reasonable and required in order to preserve the family relationship.

As stated

by the claimant in her Brief, at page 14, " ••• it is not conceivable that
a successful marriage could exist with the partners permanently residing in
different states."

(Emphasis added)

Claimant offers no explanation why she

would have been required to permanently reside in Utah whi 1e her husband
attended law school in California.

Obviously, alternatives were available to

the claimant other than simply quitting her work on August 14, 1981.

Such

alternatives could have included a search for work in California during a
vacation period or with a leave of absence from her Utah employer, prior to
her terminating her employment and moving to California.
Although the State of Washington, as cited by the claimant in her Brief,
and other ju ri sd i ct ions have chosen to a11 ow unemp 1oyment benefits as a
matter of state policy to aid in the preservation of the marital relationship
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when one's spouse leaves the area and the other must

~uit

the. spouse, not all states have adopted such a policy.

work to accompany

For instance, Penn-

sylvania, Alabana, Louisianna, Montana, New York, South Carolina and Virginia
hold that leaving work to accompany a spouse is not good cause.
tion, 13 ALR 2d 876.

See Annota-

According to a Massachusetts Court, the Courts of New

Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania had held that family obligations could
justify leaving a job, but the Legislature in each of those states nullified
the effect of the Court decisions by amending their statutes.

Raytheon Com-.

pany v. Dirctor of Division of Employment Security, 196 N.E. 2d 196 {Mass.,
1964).

In the case of __,_.....
Ayers v. Employment Security Department, 536 P. 2d 610

(Wash. 1975), cited by claimant in her Brief, Hamilton, Associate Justice,
dissented, stating:
In our mobile society and economy it is not uncommon on
change of employment cites or locations for families to
be temporarily separated, all without adverse effect
upon the family relationship. There is no evidence whatsoever in this case that the temporary separation which
would have been involved would have threatened the marriage, upset the domestic tranquility, or othewise cause
any unreasonable inconvenience.
Although the foregoing statement is found in a dissent and may not be considered as having the same force and effect as the holding of the Ayers case, it
states very well the position of the commission in cases such as the instant
matter.
It may al so be noted that the position of the commission with respect
to the issue herein is not inconsistent with legislative intent, as evidenced
by a recent amendment to Section 5(a) of the Act in which the 1982 Session
of the Utah Legislature has denied benefits to a claimant who leaves work~
accompany a spouse.

(Senate Bill 68, 1982 Budget Session.)

While this most
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recent amendment is not cited as the law applicable to the instant case,

it

does evidence the intent of the Legislature with respect to the question
herein presented.
CONCLUSION
The denial of benefits in this case is consistent with the legislative
intent underlying the Utah Employment Security Act and the decision of the
commission is supported by substantial competent evidence.

It should, there-

fore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

- - day

of April, 1982.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. AST! N
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorn~y General

By

-K-.-A-1-1-a_n_z_a~b-e-1~~~----~---

Special Assistant Attorney General
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